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What Are the Causes of Rising
Wage Inequality in the
United States?
John Bound and George Johnson*
uring the past ﬁfteen years—but especially
during the 1980s—most measures of wage
and earnings inequality in the United
States increased. The facts are as follows:
• The relative earnings of more educated relative to less
educated workers (of both genders), after falling
somewhat in the 1970s, rose precipitously in the
1980s. The college/noncollege relative wage has con-
tinued to rise during the early 1990s, but at a slower
rate than in the 1980s.
• For workers who are not college-educated, the ratio of
older to younger workers’ wages increased substantially
during the 1980s. This trend has continued into the
early 1990s for women and at a slower rate for men.
• The ratio of women’s to men’s wages, other observable
variables held constant, increased slightly during the
1970s, rapidly during the 1980s, and even more rap-
idly in the early 1990s. Since women tend to earn less
than men, this development, unlike the others,
reduced wage and earnings inequality.
• For most subgroups of the work force, the variance of
earnings after adjusting for the effects of observable
variables (education, age, region, union representa-
tion, and so forth) increased in the 1970s and 1980s.
Our preliminary analysis of 1993 Current Population
Survey data suggests that within-group variation has
not changed perceptibly in the early 1990s.
These developments with respect to the structure
of earnings have occurred during a twenty-year period in
which, depending on which price index is utilized, the
average level of real wages has been either constant or fall-
ing slightly. Thus, gains for one group of workers (college
graduates, women, persons in their forties and ﬁfties, and
those in the highest percentiles of their relevant wage dis-
tributions) may appear to the public to come at the expense
of other groups (that is, the outcome of some sort of zero
per capita sum game). The situation has spurred all sorts of
policy proposals, ranging from import restrictions to a
major increase in government training programs.
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A rational policy response to the observed changes
in the real level and structure of earnings must, of course,
be based on a diagnosis of the causes of the changes, and
“the causes of rising inequality” question has spurred a great
deal of research by economists. The major candidates for
explaining the wage structure phenomena in this (relatively
new and rapidly growing) literature include the following:
A. Changes in the composition of labor supply—includ-
ing a slowdown in the growth rate of that fraction of
the work force with high levels of schooling, the
effects of the increase in the labor force attachment of
women, and an increase in the supply of low-skilled
immigrants (both legal and otherwise).
B. The increased openness of the U.S. economy, magni-
ﬁed by the trade deﬁcit that emerged in the 1980s
(and that will continue as long as the national saving
rate remains low).
C. The decline in the relative importance of trade union-
ism in the United States.
D. An acceleration in the rate of skill-biased technologi-
cal change, brought about in large part by the adop-
tion of computer technology.
This paper is an interim report on continuing
work that we began in 1988. Our earlier research on the
causes of wage structure changes in the 1980s (Bound and
Johnson 1992) showed that part of explanation A (the
slowdown in the growth rate of that fraction of the work
force with high levels of schooling) and especially explana-
tion D were the most plausible; explanations B and C,
within our methodological framework, did not appear to
be very important. However, an explanation (of anything)
that involves technological change is necessarily circum-
stantial (as opposed to the “smoking gun” type of evi-
dence), and there is clearly a distribution of opinion in the
emerging literature on the question of the relative explana-
tory power of A, B, C, and D.
The ultimate determination of the “correct” expla-
nation of the wage structure phenomena of the 1980s will
depend in large part on what happens to them in the
future. Accordingly, in the next section, we compare
changes in wages from 1988 to 1993 with the changes of
the 1970s and 1980s, which have been the primary focus of
the literature. In the following section, we return to what
we think has been learned about the causes of changes in
the wage structure.
WAGE CHANGES FROM THE 1970S
TO THE 1990S
Many of the facts about changes in the structure of wage
rates listed above are apparent from inspection of Table 1,
in which estimated (geometric) mean wage rates of high
school and college graduates for four different amounts of
potential labor market experience (age 18 for high school
and age 22 for college) are reported separately for men and
women. The wage rates are in 1993 prices (adjusted by the
deﬂator for personal consumption expenditure).
The behavior of these data between 1973 and
1988 has been the subject of numerous papers (see Kosters
1991 and the survey paper by Levy and Murnane 1992).
Two of the trends of the 1980s, the increases in the relative
earnings of highly educated workers and of women, appear
to have continued in the 1988-93 period, the ﬁrst at a
slower rate and the second at a faster rate. First, the annual
growth rate of the college/high school relative wage during
the 1979-88 interval was 1.8 percent for men and 1.3 per-
cent for women. For the 1988-93 interval these rates of
divergence were, respectively, 0.7 and 0.9 percent. It thus
appears that the growth of the educational differential is
continuing, but the growth is declining.1 Second, during
the 1980s the relative wage of women, other things equal,
grew by 0.8 percent per year, and in the 1988-93 interval
this rate of convergence increased to 1.3 percent.
An alternative comparison of the 1979-88 and
1988-93 intervals is given in Table 2. The table relates log-
arithmic changes in median weekly earnings data by occu-
pation and by gender to three variables:  the proportion of
workers in that occupation of that gender with 4+ years of
college (from the 1980 Census), whether or not the occupa-
tion is “white collar” (professional, managerial, technical,
or clerical), and a dummy variable for a female observation.
The per annum effect of the ﬁrst and second variables was
positive in both periods but greater in the ﬁrst than in the
second interval. The estimated ceteris paribus relative wage
increase of women was slightly greater than the estimatesFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JANUARY 1995 11
based on the micro data in the 1980s and slightly smaller
in the 1988-93 period.2
REASONS FOR THE RISE IN INEQUALITY
One of the major puzzles about the behavior of the wage
structure during the 1980s is why the return to observed
skill (education and experience) rose while the labor force
was becoming more educated and older. In terms of a con-
ventional market-clearing model of the labor market, the
observation of a rise in the relative price of skill in the face
of an increase in its relative supply means that the relative
demand function must have shifted to the right during the
1980s (see ﬁgure on page 12). This conclusion is the start-
ing point for most analyses of the problem.
RELATIVE SUPPLY CHANGES
There are many (roughly an inﬁnity) of alternativeapproaches
to the disaggregation of the aggregate labor force into skill
categories. The most straightforward of these, following
Katz and Murphy (1992), is to transform different groups
into units of high school labor and units of college labor.
The relative supply of higher to lower skilled labor is then
s = (Nco+mcoNco)/(Nhs+ldoNdo+lsoNso), where Ni is the
aggregate employment of labor in each of the four educa-
tional categories and mso and the li’s are the contribution
of each category to the relevant ﬂow of labor services. Esti-
mates of the fraction of total employment (in all experience
groups and both genders) for 1960-93 are shown in Table 3
as well as a version of s withldo =.8 lso = mso =.50.3
Sources:  Bound and Johnson 1992 for 1973-88, updated with data from the Current Population Survey for 1988 and 1993. Price index used is the personal consumption
deﬂator, Economic Report of the President, 1994, Table 3.
Table 1
ESTIMATED AVERAGE REAL WAGE RATES OF HIGH SCHOOL AND COLLEGE GRADUATES
By Years of Potential Experience (x) and Gender
Hourly Wages (1993 Dollars) Growth Rates
1973 1979 1988 1993 1973-79 1979-88 1988-93
MEN
x=5
High school 11.03 10.43 8.92 7.73 -.009 -.017 -.029
College 14.30 13.25 14.84 13.18 -.013 .013 -.024
x=15
High school 14.38 14.07 12.58 11.17 -.004 -.012 -.024
College 19.09 17.79 18.07 16.96 -.012 .002 -.013
x=25
High school 15.64 14.91 14.52 12.62 -.008 -.003 -.028
College 21.01 19.90 20.85 18.75 -.009 -.005 -.021
x=35
High school 15.41 15.15 14.71 13.37 -.003 -.003 -.019
College 20.62 19.65 21.53 19.77 -.008 .010 -.017
WOMEN
x=5
High school 8.06 8.00 7.55 6.98 -.001 -.006 -.016
College 11.76 10.81 12.21 11.83 -.014 .014 -.006
x=15
High school 10.50 9.01 9.28 8.98 -.026 .003 -.006
College 12.74 12.38 13.89 14.37 -.005 .013 .007
x=25
High school 9.28 9.26 9.44 9.27 .000 .002 -.004
College 13.59 12.27 13.73 14.38 -.017 .013 .009
x=35
High school 9.48 9.39 9.43 9.15 -.002 .000 -.006
College 14.11 12.24 13.61 14.17 -.024 .012 .00812 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JANUARY 1995
The relative supply of skills increased at a slower
rate in the 1980s than in the 1970s, in part because of
the huge temporary increase in male college enrollment
in the late 1960s. Given the rate of shift of the relative
demand function, the average rate of growth (for men
and women)  of the college/high school relative wage
during the 1979-88 interval, .016, would have been
much lower. Using the values of s in Table 4, we deter-
mine that the amount by which it would have been
lower is the reciprocal of the relative labor demand elas-
ticity (about 1/1.5) *.042-.029 = .0087.4
Two other forms of labor supply change have been
occurring since the early 1970s. First, the large increase in
the average degree of labor market attachment of women
has caused an increase in the ratio of their average actual to
potential labor market experience. In addition, women are
tending to enter many jobs that were once performed
almost entirely by men.5 Thus, women’s wage/potential
experience proﬁles are gradually looking more like men’s,
and the rate of convergence increased in the 1988-93
period. Second, the growth rate of the effective supplies of
relatively low-skilled labor has been much larger because of
the large-scale immigration (both legal and illegal) of the
1980s, which presumably has continued into the 1990s.
Aggregating immigrants’ labor services with those of
natives poses additional technical problems, but immigra-
tion appears to have had a nonnegligible effect on rising
inequality in the United States.6
THE INCREASE IN NET IMPORTS
Considerable attention has been paid to international eco-
nomic integration and the emergence of a quasi-permanent
foreign trade deﬁcit for the United States. These develop-
ments have led several observers to identify net imports as
a cause of rising wage inequality. The most trade-sensitive
sectors of the economy tend to be very low-skill-intensive
(as Table 4 shows for durable goods and mining). These
industries also tend to pay higher wage rates than other
industries. Thus, a decrease in the relative size of these
Sources:  U.S. Census, Occupation Characteristics, 1980; Employment and Earnings,
January 1989, Table 54, and January 1994, Table 54.
Table 2
ESTIMATED DETERMINANTS OF LOGARITHMIC CHANGE IN
RELATIVE MEDIAN EARNINGS
1979-88 1988-93













































Sources:  Data for 1960:  1960 U.S. Census, Employment Status and Work Expe-
rience, PC (2)-6A, Table 20; data for 1973-88: Bound and Johnson 1992, Table 1;
data for 1993: Current Population Reports, P20-476.
Table 3
DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT, AGES 18-24
By Years of Schooling
1960 1973 1979 1988 1993
Dropouts (<12) .504 .267 .191 .125 .143
High school (12) .286 .426 .431 .422 .346
Some college (13-15) .111 .179 .186 .213 .288
College (16+) .099 .158 .193 .239 .253
Relative skill index (s) .196 .308 .398 .515 .604
Growth Rates
60-73 73-79 79-88 88-92
Relative skill index .035 .042 .029 .032
College/noncollege .042 .040 .030 .015
Determination of Relative Wages by Skill with ￿
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industries would have the effect of increasing the relative
wages of skilled worker through both a market effect and a
reduction in the relative average rents received by less
skilled workers.
The strongest case for international developments
as the cause of rising inequality is advanced by Borjas and
Ramey (1994). They relate the college/high school relative
wage to a number of potential causal factors and conclude
that the increase in the durable goods trade deﬁcit/GDP,7
which rose about 2 percentage points from 1979 to 1987,
is the only variable that consistently tracks the path of
Wco/Whs. Their results suggest that if the United States
eliminated the current trade deﬁcit (through appropriate
policies to bring aggregate spending in line with aggregate
supply), Wco/Whs would return fairly quickly to its 1979
value.
The problem with this argument is that the dura-
ble goods sector constitutes too small a fraction of the
employment of all educational groups to have been able to
generate relative wage movements of the magnitude
observed during the 1980s. A more plausible estimate of
the portion of the .016 growth of Wco/Whs during this
interval attributable to the increase in this deﬁcit variable
is between .0011 and .0017 (Bound, Johnson, and Stafford
1994).8
INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS
Several explanations for the rise in wage inequality focus on
changes in wage-setting institutions. (Bluestone and Har-
rison [1988] offer an extensive discussion of the possibili-
ties.) The change most commonly cited as a cause is the
decline in union representation in the United States.9 The
reasoning is straightforward. If unions increase the wage
rates of their members by 100M percent above the level
they would achieve in the absence of representation, a gen-
eral decline in the extent of unionism will lower the aver-
age wages of groups that initially had high union
representation.10
The problem with this argument is that it ignores
the effects of union wage policy on nonunion wages. If a set
of jobs usually performed by a particular type of labor is
unionized and the employer forced to pay higher wages,
the supply of labor to all other jobs done by that type of
labor will increase with a concomitant reduction in wages.
It is thus not clear if the average wage for the group rises or
falls with the increase in union representation.11 The quali-
tative effects of a fall in union representation, such as
occurred at an accelerating rate in the 1980s, are similarly
unclear.12
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Several investigations of the rising inequality phenomenon
have concluded that the principal reason for the rightward
shift in the relative demand function is skill-biased techno-
logical change (for example, Mincer 1987, Johnson and
Bound 1992, and Topel 1994). Many studies have found
that there is much greater shifting of relative demand func-
tions within industries than between industries (Davis and
Haltwinger 1991; Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994).
Other studies have shown a direct link between the intro-
duction of “information capital” and the skill composition
of demand (Berndt, Morrison, and Rosenblum 1992) and
between individual wages and on-the-job use of computers
(Krueger 1991).
Our suspicion is that a secular shift in production
functions in favor of workers with relatively high intellec-
tual as opposed to manual ability—a process that acceler-
ated during the 1980s because of computers—is
responsible, in concert with the slowdown of the growth in
the relative supply of skilled labor, for most of the wage
phenomena that have been observed.13
The obvious problem with this view is that the Source:  Data from Bound and Johnson 1992.
Table 4
ESTIMATED PROPORTION OF EMPLOYMENT IN DURABLE




1973 1988 1973 1988
Group
Dropouts .267 .125 .085 .112
High school .196 .153 .068 .092
Some college .161 .118 .073 .091
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evidence in favor of it is largely circumstantial; it is very
difﬁcult to claim to have found a “smoking gun” in what is
essentially an argument involving residuals. The relative
demand function, however, has been shifting to the right
for a long time (as pointed out in Welch 1970). For exam-
ple, our skill supply index in Table 3 grew at an average
annual rate of .032 from 1940 to 1993. In order for the
1993 college/high school relative wage to be roughly equal
to its 1940 value, the relative demand function would have
to shift to the right by over 400 percent. At the risk of
arguing tautologically, the source of this shift has to be
technology.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As we noted in the opening section of the paper, the con-
sensus on the “story” of rising wage inequality in the 1980s
(and into the 1990s) will not be decided deﬁnitively until
ten to twenty years of additional data are available. In our
view, the relative demand for skill function will continue
to shift to the right at a fairly rapid rate—although proba-
bly not as rapidly as it appeared to shift in the 1980s.14
Thus, the future rate of growth of the skill differential will
depend on whether the supply of skills grows more or less
rapidly than the position of the demand-for-skills curve.
We have done some preliminary work on the con-
struction of a model to forecast the relative supply of skill
and thus, conditional on the rate of growth of the demand
curve shift parameter, changes in the skill differential.
Space does not permit a discussion of the model here,15 but
it is clear from recent data on both the age distribution of
educational attainment and school enrollment rates that
the next ten years will not be characterized by an unusually
high rate of growth in the supply of skills.ENDNOTES
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1. A seemingly related development, first noticed by Juhn, Murphy, and
Pierce (1993), is the increase in within-group variance that, unlike the
educational differential, began increasing in the 1970s and continued
into the 1980s. The standard deviations of log wages within education/
experience/gender groups for whites were about the same in 1993 as they
were in 1988—although much larger than in 1979. Much further work
will be done on this question, but we take this result as suggesting that
within-group variance has, at least temporarily, stopped growing.
2. The growth rates of wages and salaries for white- and blue-collar
workers in the Bureau of Labor Statistics employer cost index, which is
based on data from firms, were very similar to those implied by (2) and
(4) in Table 2. In the 1988-93 period, about a third of the increase in the
relative wages of white-collar workers was attributable to the fact that
the fringe benefits of blue-collar workers grew more rapidly than those of
white-collar workers (a fact that was not true in the 1980s).
3. This is based on the assumption that dropouts produce 80 percent of
the services of high school graduates and that an individual with some
college produces half a unit of high school services and half a unit of
college services.   Katz and Murphy’s weights were mso =.29, ldo =.93,
ldo =.29, with the addition of mdo= -.05. The rates of growth of s with
their weights are similar to those with our weights except in the 1988-
93 interval (because our assumption gives more skill weight to those
with some college, the labor force weight of which grew rapidly).
Among the other possible specifications of the labor aggregation are that
of a constant elasticity of substitution between different demographic
groups (Bound and Johnson 1992) and the most general case of different
partial elasticities of substitution between different groups (Murphy and
Welch 1992).
4. The large rate of growth of s in the 1973-79 interval was, in fact,
abnormal (largely caused by the demand for draft deferments during the
late 1960s). The .029 rate of growth in s in the 1979-88 period was in
line with the past trends.   (For example, data from Goldin and Margo
[1992] indicate that the rate of growth of s for white males during both
the 1940s and 1950s was .031.) Thus, had there been no temporary
increase in the growth of s in the 1970s, the college/high school wage
would have started to increase in that decade rather than decreasing
slightly.
5. Further, during the 1980s and 1990s, women apparently experienced
a larger increase in their productivity relative to men in “men’s jobs” than
in “women’s jobs,” a development that, among other things, would tend
to lower the average productivity and wages of men (see Johnson and
Stafford 1994). These phenomena may explain the result of Topel (1994)
that low-skilled men and high-skilled women are substitutes in
production.
6. See Topel (1994) and Jaeger (1994).
7. Murphy and Welch (1991) also focus on this variable.
8. A considerably large fraction (up to one-fourth) of the observed
increase in the college/high school relative wage is potentially
attributable to the durable goods trade deficit.
9. See, for example, Dinardo and LeMieux (1993), who study inequality
among males, and Even and MacPherson (1993), who attribute one-
seventh of the decline in the gender gap to the decline in unionization.
10. Let wi, win, and wiu be logarithms of the average, the nonunion, and
the union wage for group i workers and Ui the proportion in union jobs.
Since wui = Wni + M, the logarithm of the average wage of group 1
relative to group 2 workers is W1-W2 = Wn1-Wn2+ M(U1-U2). If
there is a proportional decrease in union representation across all groups,
w1-w2 will—if the wni’s stay constant—rise if U2 > U1.
11. In terms of the previous footnote, wl rises or falls with an increase in
union representation of one worker as the wage elasticity of demand for
labor by job is less or greater than one.
12. Goldin and Margo (1992) argue that institutional factors (the
policies of growing unions and the War Labor Board) were a major factor
in the compression of wages during the 1940s. Given that
unemployment was very low in the latter half of that decade, it is
unlikely that unions caused large distortions in average wages by skill, an
effect that would require that union wage levels had a positive spillover
effect on nonunion wages for blue-collar labor (thus causing structural
unemployment). No such argument, of course, applies to the
semicontrolled wartime labor market of the first half of that decade.
13. A fact that does not easily fit into the technological change story is
the finding of Pierce and Welch (1994) that a large part of the increase
in the returns to college during the 1980s was “in actuality an increased
premium for college education put to use in the business and law fields.”
They report that the wages of computer specialists and engineers actually
fell relative to high school graduates during this period.
14. For example, Goldin and Margo (1992) document that the large
increase in the durable goods sector (spurred initially by World War II
and then by the demand for new products) contributed significantly to
the compression of skill differentials. Something like that—although
hopefully not World War III—may happen in the next twenty years.
Mincer (1994) suggests that the decline in research and development
during the 1980s (due largely to a decline in defense expenditure) may
reduce the future rate of shift of the relative demand function. The fact16 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JANUARY 1995 NOTES
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that the growth rate of skill differentials declined in the 1988-93 period
in the face of roughly the same supply growth as in the 1979-88 period
is consistent with Mincer’s view.
15. A major limitation of such a model is that its results are fairly
sensitive to the way in which groups with different demographic
characteristics (education, age, and gender) are aggregated into skill
categories. What are the “correct” partial elasticities of complementarity
between, for example, high school graduates, those with some college,
and college graduates, or between men and women of the same age/
education levels? The present empirical answers to these questions have
fairly wide confidence intervals.
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